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A range of Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) tools are used 
throughout the Oil & Gas industry in hazard identification 
and analysis, to understand the effects to the system as a 
result of the hazards and to eliminate/reduce/mitigate the 
identified hazards.  Prognostics and Health Management 
(PHM) is a life cycle concept introducing an integrated 
approach to the health management of a system through the 
design and operation cycles.  Therefore, if projects can be 
developed within a PHM environment, this may lead to 
greater integration between the stakeholders, with the 
potential for a technically superior product developed with 
cost and efficiency savings.  This paper demonstrates that 
functional analysis software applications can facilitate 
sensor set design to detect and isolate faults associated with 
the system’s components and that those are comparable – 
with some manual adjustment – with the traditional 
approaches used in sensor set design.  The results also show 
that a functional analysis approach is a viable tool in the 
PHA process i.e. it can generate FMECA reports and can be 
used to complement HAZOP studies.  Finally using a PHM 
functional modelling application can benefit the main 
stakeholders in terms of demonstrating reliability, 
availability and maintainability of equipment whilst 
realising cost savings and improved efficiency. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Prognostics and Health Management (PHM) is an integrated 
approach in managing the health of a system throughout the 
design and operation life cycle, refer to figure 1 below. 
It is an approach that can facilitate the 
identification/definition of the hazards/functional failures 
that risk the health of the system and facilitates maintenance 
strategies, monitoring/diagnostics and failure prediction 
required to maintain the health of the system. 
 
 
1.1 PHM in the Oil & Gas Industry 
Prognostic models fall into three categories: data-driven; 
physics-based; hybrid of the two (Heng, Zhang, Tan and 
Mathew, 2009; Pecht, 2008; Lee, Wu, Zhao, Ghaffari, Liao 
and Siegel, 2014; Guillén, Crespo, Macchi and Gómez, 
Kenneth Moir et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the 
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License, 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any 
medium, provided the original author and source are credited. 
Figure 1. PHM Cycle (Stecki, Cross, Stecki and Lucas, 
2012) 
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2016; Javed, Gouriveau and Zerhouni, 2017; Le Son, 
Fouladirad, Barros, Levrat and Iung, 2013). 
The data-driven method utilises the data collated as part of 
the condition monitoring process to provide an indication of 
component/system failure and therefore predict the 
remaining time before the component fails (Pecht, 2008; 
Heng, Zhang, Tan and Mathew, 2009). 
The model-based method requires that the physical system 
including the inter-relationship between subsystems are 
replicated in mathematical/physics-based models e.g. 
differential equations, transfer functions etc. (Pecht, 2008). 
The hybrid method utilises both the data-driven method and 
the model-based method recognising that both methods have 
advantages/disadvantages and therefore the hybrid approach 
seeks to capitalise on the advantages from both systems. 
The Oil & Gas industry typically adopts a data-driven 
prognostic approach as a first attempt in the development of 
a PHM capability, in conjunction with rigorous maintenance 
routines. 
1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Paper 
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the use of PHM 
functional modelling software and its associated suite of 
software tools, to assess its applicability and suitability 
during the engineering design of an Oil-Injected Rotary 
Screw Compressor, with respect to existing process hazard 
analysis tools and existing methods of instrumenting a 
compressor prevalent in industry. 
The objectives that are set for this paper are as follows: (1) 
Create a functional model of an Oil-Injected Rotary Screw 
Gas Compressor from standard engineering design 
drawings; (2) Identify key components of the system and 
analyse the effects of their functional failure and how the 
functional failure propagates throughout the system; (3) 
Analyse the sensor set assignments generated from the 
functional model and assess their suitability; (4) Compare 
the software tools available from a functional 
analysis/modelling application with the tools that are 
currently used in industry; (5) Identify the Stakeholders, 
their roles and responsibilities and interdependencies 
associated with the life cycle of an Oil-Injected Rotary 
Screw Gas Compressor throughout the design and 
operational phases. 
1.3 Organisation of the Paper 
The paper is organised and presented as follows: Section 1 
provides a brief introduction to PHM in the Oil & Gas 
industry; Section 2 discusses the challenges in 
implementing a PHM approach; Section 3 briefly describes 
the operation of an Oil-Injected Rotary Screw Compressor; 
Section 4 discusses Functional Modelling/Failures; Section 
5 analyses the functional failure analysis of key components 
of the system; Section 6 provides some concluding remarks. 
2. PHM ANALYSIS IN THE OIL & GAS INDUSTRY - 
CHALLENGES & OPPORTUNITIES 
There are several challenges in implementing a PHM 
approach in the Oil & Gas industry, which is heavily 
regulated at a national/international level and one where the 
operating/profit margins vary significantly depending on the 
geographical location of the facility.  This next section 
discusses some of these challenges. 
2.1 PHM, Maintenance and the Cost of Downtime 
The costs associated with the production of oil and gas 
varies depending on the geographical location across the 
world.  (McKinsey & Company, 2014) published a report 
indicating that over the course of the past 10 years, that 
operating and maintenance costs have increased by 10% per 
year.  In the last 2-3 years, with the margins as tight as they 
are, operators typically resort to scaling back certain 
activities with new developments, small projects etc. usually 
being shelved.  However, maintenance activities can also be 
delayed or scaled back e.g. planned shutdowns delayed or 
reverting to breakdown maintenance strategies.  (McKinsey 
& Company, 2014) suggest that in the UK Continental 
Shelf, plant failure and unplanned shutdowns accounted for 
nearly 50% of overall losses and that planned maintenance 
shutdowns accounting for 25% of losses.  (McKinsey & 
Company, 2014) identified three key performance related 
features: (1) The more efficient operators were far more 
likely to minimise planned downtime; (2) Reliability 
improvements due to lessons learned; (3) Embracing a 
culture within the workforce to take better care of the 
equipment that is in use 24/7. 
 
The drive to cut operating and maintenance costs is pushing 
the agenda that is leading to the adoption of predictive 
maintenance strategies. 
A study by (Kimberlite, 2016) cited in (GE Oil & Gas, 
2016) suggested that by moving towards a predictive 
maintenance strategy, organisations can reduce unplanned 
downtime and still realise improved operational efficiency. 
The (Kimberlite, 2016) study cited in (GE Oil & Gas, 2016) 
also noted that most of the operators included in their study 
used reactive or planned maintenance strategies and a much 
smaller percentage used predictive ones, refer to table 1 
below.  The table also details the percentage of unplanned 
downtime associated with each maintenance strategy. 
As can be noted from the details in table 1, less than one 
quarter of the operators are using predictive/proactive 
maintenance strategies and they are reaping the benefits by 
having less unplanned downtime.  Whilst the percentage 
values appear to be relatively small, if you translate the 










This is highlighted in figure 2 below.  It has been estimated 
by (Kimberlite, 2016) cited in (GE Oil & Gas, 2016) that 
the financial impact of downtime associated with the 
maintenance strategy adopted and the cost differential is 
significant - $58M/$59M for the reactive/planned 
maintenance strategies compared with $24M for the 




It appears to be evident that operators can make significant 
savings in terms of loss of revenue and lost days by 
adopting predictive/proactive maintenance strategies and 
reduce unplanned downtime. 
2.2 Maintenance 
Fundamentally, maintenance is the “combination of all 
technical, administrative and managerial actions during the 
life cycle of an item intended to retain it in, or restore it to, a 
state in which it can perform the required function.” (British 
Standard, BS EN 13306:2010).  (Dhillon 2002; Duffuaa, 
Raouf, and Campbell 1999) cited in (Ahmad & 
Kamaruddin, 2012) define maintenance “as a set of 
activities or tasks used to restore an item to a state in which 
it can perform its designated functions.” 
(Guillén, Crespo, Macchi and Gómez, 2016) summarise the 
various maintenance strategies and these are shown in figure 
3 below. 
Corrective Maintenance was one of the first strategies 
deployed in industry and it is often referred to as “Failure-
Based-Maintenance”, “Run-to-Failure” or “Breakdown 
Maintenance” (Jardine, Lin and Banjevic, 2006).  Referring 
to the acronyms used in figure 3 for corrective maintenance, 
the following applies: FBM – Failure Based Maintenance; 




Preventative maintenance strategies are designed to: prevent 
the failure based on time or usage (irrespective of 
condition); prevent the failure based on current condition; 
prevent the failure by analysing current condition with 
historical data; predict when the failure will be and then act 
in a timely manner to prevent the failure.  The whole 
hypothesis for preventative maintenance is to implement the 
required maintenance actions to prevent equipment failure 
(Ahmad & Kamaruddin, 2012).  Referring to the acronyms 
used in figure 3 for preventative maintenance, the following 
applies: DOM – Design Out Maintenance. 
Scheduled Maintenance is defined in (British Standard, BS 
EN 13306:2010) as “maintenance carried in accordance 
with an established time schedule or established number of 
units of use”.  Referring to the acronyms used in figure 3 for 
scheduled maintenance, the following applies: TBM – Time 
Based Maintenance; UBM – Usage Based Maintenance. 
Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) is defined in (British 
Standard, BS EN 13306:2010) as “preventative maintenance 
which includes a combination of condition monitoring 
techniques and/or inspection and/or testing analysis and the 
ensuing maintenance actions”.  CBM incorporates 
Predictive Maintenance and PHM amongst others.  
Referring to the acronyms used in figure 3 for condition-
based-maintenance, the following applies: CBM – 




Correlation between Maintenance Strategy and Unplanned Downtime
Figure 2. Costs of unplanned downtime (Kimberlite, 
2016) cited in (GE Oil & Gas, 2016) 
Table 1. Maintenance Strategy vs Unplanned Downtime 
(Kimberlite, 2016) cited in (GE Oil & Gas, 2016) 
Figure 3. Maintenance Strategies (Guillén, Crespo, 
Macchi and Gómez, 2016) 
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Condition Based Maintenance; PdM – Predictive 
Maintenance; DBM – Detection Based Maintenance; PHM 
– Prognostics Health Management. 
2.3 National/International Standards 
The software suite of tools in a functional 
analysis/modelling application may include the feature to 
design a ‘sensor set solution’ to identify faults as part of the 
functional failure analysis process, however sensors 
required for control and safety functionality are determined 
by a range of national/international standards. 
The standards applicable to an Oil Injected Rotary Screw 
Compressor are defined by the American Petroleum 
Institute (API) with the main ones being: (1) API619:2004 
Rotary-Type Positive Displacement Compressors for 
Petroleum, Petrochemical and Natural Gas Industries; (2) 
API614:2008 Lubrication, Shaft-sealing and Oil-control 
Systems and Auxiliaries; (3) API670:2000 (R2003) 
Machinery Protection Systems 
In addition to standards, the API also issue Recommended 
Practices which are similar to the standards i.e. they serve to 
provide the minimum requirements of the compressor 
package and they may form the basis for client/EPC 
specifications.  The following Recommended Practices 
would apply: (1) API RP 500 Classification of Electrical 
Installations; (2) API RP 520 Sizing, Selection and 
Installation of Pressure Relieving Devices e.g. PSV’s; (3) 
API RP 14C Analysis, Design, Installation and Testing of 
Basic Surface Safety Systems for Offshore Production 
Platforms. 
API RP 14C is a recommended practice to facilitate the 
design requirements for offshore safety systems and 
includes wellhead systems, pressure vessels, compressors, 
pumps, heat exchangers, pipelines etc.  It is a safety analysis 
process used to determine the safety concerns and 
requirements to protect process equipment.  It provides 
recommended safety devices and locations for a typical 
compressor unit and provides specific requirements in terms 
of compressor suction/discharge pressure protection, 
temperature measurement, gas detection and shutdown 
valves. 
2.4 Organisational Interfaces and Importance of PHM 
Requirements 
To develop and implement any of the prognostic approaches 
mentioned in section 1, different types of data and 
information is required (Vachtsevanos, Lewis, Roemer, 
Hess and Wu, 2006).  This information and data must be 
geared and contextualized towards a clear understanding 
and characterization of the failure and technical risk to 
specify the requirements for a PHM capability for an Oil-
Injected Rotary Screw Compressor.  It represents the output 
of several engineering disciplines being owned by various 
functional teams typically not part of the same organization.  
Please note that per the previous section, there are 
recommended standards and practices that system designers 
of such systems follow to tackle the event of a failure but 
they are only focused on specific parts or sub-systems in 
isolation.  Only recently, a recommended practice targeting 
the reliability, technical risk and integrity management at 
the system/project level was published and it is now being 
adopted by the Oil & Gas community (Strutt & Wells, 
2014).  Although tailored for subsea equipment, many of the 
processes referenced in API-RP-17N are equally applicable 
to top-side equipment.  During the development of this 
recommended practice, it was mentioned that the low figure 
of availability for equipment used in the Oil & Gas industry 
sector is because operators never asked specifically for 
reliability, subsequently this was not identified as a 
deliverable during the design process.  If a system level 
PHM capability is to be developed for an oil-injected rotary 
screw compressor, our view is that it should be channeled 
through a cost-benefit-risk analysis and directly linked to 
FMECA or HAZOP, therefore direct access to operational 
reliability data is instrumental in setting the scene for the 
requirement capture phase (Saxena, Roychoudhury, Celaya, 
Saha, Saha, and Goegel, 2010).  On the other hand, the 
availability of operational reliability is one of the main 
concerns raised by various OEMs throughout forums and 
workshops aimed at the design and development of 
condition monitoring solutions for Oil & Gas production 
and processing equipment.  The PHM requirements should 
be split into requirements covering two main areas: 
Maintenance Management (ReqMM) and Integrity 
Management (ReqIM), refer to figure 4 below.  Although all 
stakeholders: operators, OEMs, design/engineering services, 
maintenance and regulators should be involved in the 
discussions, we have found that the first set of requirements 
(ReqMM) are usually driven by the discussions between the 
Operator and the OEM, while the second set of 
requirements (ReqIM) must involve the Design/Engineering 
services and the Regulators with considerations for 
significant input from the OEM and Operator.  The ReqMM 
should be targeting primarily cost through increased uptime, 
efficient maintenance, optimized lifecycle.  The ReqIM are 
typically targeting the safety, reliability and efficient 
operations.  Figure 4 below highlights the interfaces 
between the stakeholders associated with Maintenance 









3. OIL INJECTED ROTARY SCREW COMPRESSOR 
FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION 
The compressor used for reference in this paper is an Oil-
Injected Rotary Screw compressor driven by an electric 
motor. 
Prior to creating the functional model, used to identify 
functional failures and understanding the effects of these 
failures, an understanding of the function of the main 
components/processes of the compressor is recommended.  
This next section provides a brief description of the 
components and their process functionality. 
3.1 Oil-Injected Rotary Screw Compressor 
Rotary screw compressors operate on the principle of 
positive displacement (Stosic, Smith and Kovacevic, 2003) 
i.e. a volume of gas is drawn into the compressor casing via 
the suction/inlet port; the available volume is reduced, 
thereby compressing the gas; the compressed gas exits the 
casing at a higher pressure via the discharge port (Stosic, 
Smith and Kovacevic, 2011). 
In an oil-injected compressor, lubricating oil is injected into 
the compressor casing via a dedicated port and mixes with 
the process gas.  The lube oil forms a film between the lobes 
of the male/female rotors and is also used to lubricate the 
bearings, the mechanical seal, shafts and it also acts as a 
coolant i.e. it facilitates the heat absorption during the 
compression process.  The lube oil is also used to operate 
the hydraulic slide valve mechanism to enable capacity 
control of the compressor. 
3.2 Compressor Process Gas/Oil Systems 
3.2.1 Suction Knock Out Drum 
The suction Knock-Out drum is located upstream of the 
compressor inlet port and it is designed to remove any liquid 
droplets entrained in the gas flow prior to it entering the 
compressor casing.  Coalescer elements are installed in the 
gas flow with entrained liquid dropping out by gravity, 
collecting in the bottom of the vessel – a level control 
system is used to control the liquid level in the Knock-Out 
drum.  Dry gas is then routed to the compressor inlet port.  
Recycle gas is also routed to the suction Knock-Out drum 
from downstream of the gas cooler. 
Figure 4. Stakeholder Interfaces 
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3.2.2 Rotary Screw Compressor 
The rotary screw compressor consists of two helical rotors 
that mesh together, one rotor is referred to as the male rotor 
(driving) and the other is the female (driven).  The male 
rotor is connected via a flexible shaft coupling to the 
electrically operated main drive motor.  The male rotor 
contains four lobes which mesh with six flutes on the female 
rotor. 
‘Dry’ hydrocarbon gas from the suction Knock-Out drum is 
routed through the inlet strainer, designed to remove solid 
particles, into the compressor casing at the compressor 
inlet/suction port.  Lube Oil is injected into the gas stream 
and the gas/oil mixture fills the void between the helical 
rotors and as the rotors rotate, the meshing of the 
lubes/flutes reduces the area occupied by the gas/oil mixture 
which in turn causes compression of the gas/oil mixture.  
The compressed gas/oil mixture is discharged into the 
Primary Gas/Oil Separator and Oil Reservoir where gravity 
separation takes place. 
The capacity of the compressor is controlled via a slide 
valve with the recycle valve used for fine tuning of the 
capacity control.  The slide valve is operated hydraulically 
utilising lube oil. 
3.2.3 Primary Separator and Oil Reservoir 
As the gas/oil mixture enters the combined 
separator/reservoir, the gas expands and its velocity drops 
and as it does, the oil liquid drops out by gravity into the 
reservoir.  The gas flow and any residual entrained oil flows 
through primary and secondary separators to remove all the 
oil content, which drops by gravity into the reservoir.  Oil 
free gas is discharged from the separator and routed to the 
combined gas and lube oil cooler. 
3.2.4 Gas Cooler 
The gas is routed through a tube bundle and two fans are 
used to draw cold air up over the tube bundle to cool the 
process gas.  The same fans are used to cool the lube oil 
which is routed through a separate tube bundle but within 
the same housing as the gas tube bundle.  The gas cooler 
discharge temperature is controlled by varying the speed of 
the fans. 
4. OIL INJECTED ROTARY SCREW COMPRESSOR 
FUNCTIONAL MODELLING 
The MADe™ software application (version 3.7.1) shall be 
used to model the oil injected rotary screw compressor.  The 
suite of tools available within this software shall allow me 
to model the flows of energy throughout the system e.g. 
pressure, flow, torque, angular velocity, electrical and 
therefore understand the effects of component functional 
failure to these energy flows. 
4.1 Oil-Injected Rotary Screw Compressor (Gas) Model 
A PFD of the system was created from a suite of P&ID’s 
available from one of the OEM’s that manufacture this type 
of compressor. 
The functional model was focused on the forward flow of 
process gas and the recycle flow of Lube Oil. 
4.2 Functions and Flows 
Each component requires the assignment of functions and 
flows.  The functions describe the operation of the 
component and what it does, they can be quite generic. 
Modelling the inflows/outflows for each component is more 
detailed and forms the basis for functional failure analysis 
and the associated sensor set assignment designed to detect 
functional failure. 
The flow of energy between components are mapped as 
inflows and outflows within each component.  Figures 5 and 
6 below detail the philosophy that is used in determining the 
inflows/outflows for the components used in the modelling 
of the compressor. 
Simulation of a component failure is achieved by initiating a 
perturbation of the outflow in the direction of the 
components functional failure e.g. in the example of the 
valve in figure 5, a perturbation of High or Low Flow would 




The motor shown in figure 6 below, details a power source 
i.e. voltage for each electrically operated component with 
corresponding control signals e.g. start/stop, on/off. 
 
Figure 5. Energy Flows between Components – 
pipework, valve, vessel, compressor 




The model also details the ‘causal’ relationships between 
the inflows/outflows in each component.  This is essential 
when it comes to the analysis of component functional 
failure and how that failure propagates through the 
downstream connected components. 
4.3 Failure Diagrams 
For each component, corresponding failure diagrams were 
identfied, these map out the sequence of events leading to 
the component functional failure mode.  The failure diagram 
details the following: causes, mechanisms, faults - that will 
result in a functional failure of the component.  Standard 
definitions for these failure concepts are listed below. 
1. Failure Cause – set of circumstances that leads to 
failure (British Standard, BS EN ISO 14224:2016) 
2. Failure Mechanism – process that leads to failure.  
The process can be physical, chemical, logical or a 
combination thereof. (British Standard, BS EN ISO 
14224:2016) 
3. Fault – inability to perform as required, due to an 
internal state (British Standard, BS EN ISO 
14224:2016) 
4. Failure – loss of ability to perform as required 
(British Standard, BS EN ISO 14224:2016); 
termination of the ability of an item to perform a 
required function (British Standard, BS EN 
60812:2006) 
Data provided in the Failure Mechanism/Mode tables in 
OREDA Vol.1 taxonomy 1.1 was used to define component 
failure mechanisms where functional failure of a component 
is the failure of its outflow.  The failure diagrams are 
developed by establishing correlations between faults and 
functional failures as well as the failure conditions for each 
component. 
4.4 Component Functional Failure 
The functional modelling software allows the user to 
identify key components for functional failure analysis, 
simulate a failure of the component and understand how that 
failure propagates throughout the system. 
For the components selected for functional failure analysis 
with respect to the failure direction of the outflow - 
flowrate, pressure, electrical/mechanical energy outflow 
parameters were selected to decrease, whereas temperature 
could be selected for increase only or both increase and 
decrease.  This selection is based on the functional operation 
of the compressor and the physics associated with these 
parameters. 
4.5 FMECA 
The functional modelling software application allows the 
user to perform a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality 
Analysis and generate the reports.  The criticality analysis is 
performed by determining the Risk Priority Number (RPN). 
Where the RPN is a quantitative measure of defining 
severity within the FMECA process as noted in (British 
Standard, BS EN 60812:2006) and is the product of Severity 
(S) x Probability of Occurrence (O) x Detection (D). 
Industry generated FMECA Reports are considered as 
proprietary and therefore unavailable to individuals outside 
of the companies that generate them, therefore engineering 
judgement was applied when assessing the Severity, 
Occurrence and Detectability ranking values – the ranking 
values used in the functional model were based on tables 4,5 
and 6 (British Standard, BS EN 60812:2006). 
4.6 Selection of Components for Failure Analysis 
The following documents were used for guidance when 
selecting components for functional failure analysis and 
sensor set design: (1) Offshore and Onshore Reliability Data 
(OREDA), 6th Edition, Volume 1 – Topside Equipment, 
2015; (2) LOPA/SIL Reports provided by the Compressor 
OEM; (3) Components identified during the FMECA 
process with a higher Risk Priority Number (RPN). 
(OREDA, 2015) defines failure as “The termination or the 
degradation of the ability of an item to perform its required 
function(s)”.  It further categorises failure into Critical, 
Degraded, Incipient and Unknown failures.  Critical failures 
result in the instantaneous failure of the system/equipment 
which leads into a diagnostic mode to understand why.  
Degraded and incipient failures do not result in an 
instantaneous failure of the system but over time, if not 
attended to, the failure will deteriorate to the point at which 
the system fails.  It is these two categories that are the focus 
of a PHM approach in terms of a maintenance strategy. 
The LOPA/SIL report assessed several safety instrumented 
functions (SIF) to determine the Safety Integrity Level 
(SIL).  Three SIF’s were identified for SIL 2 categorisation: 
Figure 6. Energy Flows between Components – motor, 
compressor, pipework 
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Compressor Discharge Pressure High; Compressor 
Discharge Temperature High and Compressor Gas/Oil 
Pressure Differential Low.  SIL can be defined as a relative 
level of risk reduction provided by a Safety Instrumented 
Function (SIF).  It is a measure of the Probability of the 
Failure on Demand (PFD2) of the SIF and consists of 4 
levels (1-4), 4 being the highest.  The PFD’s for SIL’s 1-4 
are: SIL1, 0.1 – 0.01; SIL2, 0.001 – 0.001; SIL3, 0.001 – 
0.0001; SIL4, 0.0001 – 0.00001. 
The FMECA report highlighted several component failures 
with severity rankings of 8/9: a fracture of the gas pipework; 
failure of the main drive motor; failure of the gas/oil 
pressure differential control valve and lube oil filter 
blockage. 
Table 2 below details the four key components that have 
been initially identified for functional failure analysis and 
sensor set design. 
 
5. DIAGNOSTIC ANALYSIS 
The Propagation Table is the main tool for analysing the 
model as it details the components selected for functional 
failure analysis and the effects of that failure as it 
propagates throughout the model. 
A diagnostic analysis of the Propagation Table will identify 
the optimum number and associated location of sensors that 
will detect/isolate the component responsible for functional 
failure of the system. 
With respect to selection of sensor sets with Ambiguity 
Groups, preference was given to sensor sets that offered a 
variance in the outflow properties used to determine failure 
e.g. pressure, temperature and flow vs only temperature or 
pressure & temperature.  This provided a range of 
measurement techniques to confirm the detection of a 
functional failure of a component as opposed to just one 
measurement technique.  This minimises common cause of 
failure and therefore increases availability of the system. 
 
 
A summary of the diagnostic analysis of the system are 
detailed in table 3 above. 
Appropriate sensors were selected from the Sample Sensor 
Library within the software suite and assigned to the 
component outflows referenced in all sensor sets selected.  
Selection of sensor type/technology is detailed in table 4 
below. 
Outflow Property Sensor Type/Technology 
Pressure Piezoelectric pressure sensor 
Temperature Resistive temperature device 
Flow Differential pressure device 
(Orifice Plate) 
Torque Rotary transformer (Strain gauge) 
Angular Velocity Toothed ring & pick-up 
 
The detailed results from the analysis carried out are 
discussed in the next section. 
5.1 Diagnostic Analysis #1 
The functional model consists of 41 components and several 
sub-components, depicting the flows of process gas and 
lubricating oil used in the compressor package and their 
interdependencies, with the components/sub-components 
containing multiple inflows and outflows.  The components 
referenced in Analysis #1 to #5 are detailed on the 
functional model – this is available upon request, as 
proprietary software is required to view the model.  The 
functional model also details the location of sensors (small 
green circles) – these are based on Diagnostic Analysis#5, 
sensor set #37. 
Referring to the lower section of the table in Appendix 1, it 
can be noted that as the number of sensors increases, the 
fitness score for the sensor sets decreases.  This value is 
calculated in the software and is based on the coverage and 
the number of test points.  The upper section of the table in 
Appendix 1 is the propagation table from the model 
exported to csv/excel. 
The interpretation of the data is as follows – low pressure at 
(3) OR low mass flow rate at (4) OR (6) is indicative of a 
failure of the gas pipeline (3).  Similarly, low torque at (8a) 
OR low angular velocity at (8b) is indicative of a failure of 
the main drive motor (8a).  The same logic applies for 
failure of the lube oil supply pump and the gas oil cooler i.e. 
there is no ambiguity, one point of measurement clearly 
indicates the failed component. 
The one notable exception is the detection of low pressure at 
component (11), in this scenario, a failure of the gas 
pipeline OR the main drive motor OR the lube oil supply 
pump i.e. the reverse OR logic to the ones described above.  
However, if low pressure is detected at (11) and (3), then the 
gas pipeline is the failure point; if low pressure is detected at 
Component ID Outflow Property Perturbation Failure Mechanism Document
Inlet Gas Pipeline 3 Process Gas Pressure Low Leakage OREDA
Main Drive Motor 8a Torque Low Mechanical Failure OREDA / FMECA
Lube Oil Supply Pump 17 Lube Oil Flow rate Low Mechanical Failure OREDA
Gas Cooler Outlet Temperature 41 Process Gas Temperature High Mechanical Failure OREDA
Table 2. Components selected for Failure Analysis 
Table 3. Components selected for Failure Analysis 
Table 4. Outflow Property vs Sensor Type/Technology 
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(11) and (16), then the lube oil supply pump is the failure 
point and so on. 
The location of the measured variable differs in each of the 
sensor sets calculated and the locations of the sensors is 
detailed by the coloured squares in the table in Appendix 1.  
E.g. sensor set #17 consists of 1 x flow rate sensor, 3 x 
temperature sensors and one angular velocity sensor. 
5.2 Diagnostic Analysis #2 
In the second analysis, the Duplex LO filter low flow rate 
component was added – the table in Appendix 2 details the 
selected sensor sets for comparison. 
The introduction of the fifth component also introduced one 
Ambiguity Group to the results, consisting of low lube oil 
flow in both the Lube Oil Supply Pump (17) and the Duplex 
LO Filter (26) – reference the rows highlighted in green in 
the table in Appendix 2. 
The resultant of an Ambiguity Group is that functional 
failure of a component cannot be determined by the 
allocated sensors.  Referring to the upper section of the table 
in Appendix 2, if you review the functional failures of 
components (17) and (26), you will note that no single point 
of measurement differentiates between these two component 
failures. 
From the table in Appendix 2, it can be observed that low 
lube oil pressure (18) or low lube oil flow rate (10) indicate 
that the failure is either the LO Supply Pump or it is the 
Duplex LO Filter, but there is no singular point of 
measurement that can determine that it is one or the other. 
The logic for the other 3 components remains as described 
in analysis #1 with similar logic for low flowrate (8c) and 
low pressure (11) e.g. low pressure (3) and low pressure 
(11) is indicative of a failure of the gas pipeline (3). 
Comparing sensor sets 17 and 35 (4 sensors each), some 
trade-off should be considered – refer to the table in 
Appendix 2 upper section: 
1. Sensor set #35 results in a gas pipeline (3) failure 
being detected further downstream (5) but low 
pressure detected at component (18) is failure of 
the LO pump or the LO filter. 
2. Sensor set #17 results in a gas pipeline (3) failure 
being detected at the component itself, however a 
failure of the LO pump or the LO filter can only be 
determined by confirming that the gas pipeline or 
main drive motor have not failed – reference low 
pressure in component (11). 
Comparing sensor sets 40, 57 and 75 (5 sensors each), 
similar trade-offs should be considered – refer to the table in 
Appendix 2 upper section: 
1. The 3 groups offer different locations, flow 
properties and therefore sensor type to determine 
failure of the LO pump/filter ambiguity group i.e. 
temperature (27) and (8c) for sensor sets #40 and 
#75 respectively whilst flow (10) for sensor set 
#57. 
2. Failure of the gas pipeline component (3) can be 
determined by different sensor types and locations 
i.e. sensor set #40 utilises pressure and flow at 
components (5) and (6); sensor set #57 utilises 
pressure at components (3) and (7); sensor set #75 
utilises pressure and flow at components (3) and 
(4). 
3. The differences between the measurement points 
for failure of the gas cooler are insignificant. 
Sensor set #57’s use of flow rate may sound a good option 
for detecting the ambiguity group’s failure as the flow rate 
would deviate quicker than the temperature upon either 
component failing, however sensor set #75 utilises 
temperature measurement at the discharge of the 
compressor.  Given that the discharge temperature control of 
the compressor is a key measured variable, then sensor set 
#75 may be the better option. 
Sensor set #75 consists of 1 x mechanical/rotational torque 
sensor; 1 x pressure sensor; 1 x temperature sensor and 2 x 
flow rate sensors. 
5.3 Diagnostic Analysis #3 
In the third analysis, the TCV (32) low flow rate was added 
– the table in Appendix 3 details the selected sensor sets for 
comparison. 
The introduction of the TCV added that component to the 
Ambiguity Group created in analysis #2 i.e. the group now 
consisted of 3 components, reference the rows highlighted 
in green in the table in Appendix 3 – low lube oil flow in the 
Lube Oil Supply Pump (17), TCV (32) and the Duplex LO 
Filter (26). 
None of the 3 sensor sets were ideal as failure of the gas 
pipeline (3) was not detected until low flow at component 
(41), the gas pipeline (3) was embedded with other 
component failures and therefore requires ‘NOT’ logic to be 
applied e.g. using sensor set 36, low flow (41) and NOT low 
angular velocity and NOT {low flow (29) OR low flow (10) 
OR low temperature (8c)} = low pressure at component (3), 
refer to the table in Appendix 3 upper section. 
Sensor set #36 would be the better option from those 
available.  Sensor set #36 consists of 1 x angular velocity 
sensor; 2 x temperature sensors; 3 x flow rate sensors.  
There are no pressure sensors in this option, whereas 
pressure sensors are commonplace in compressor packages.  
For the ambiguity group, sensor set #36 offers flow and 
temperature measurement to confirm functional failure of 
the components in the group. 
5.4 Diagnostic Analysis #4 
In the fourth analysis, the TCV from analysis #3 was 
replaced by the compressor (8c) and the LO 
Separator/Reservoir (10), with high temperature and low 
flow rate selected for both these components - the table in 
Appendix 4 details the selected sensor sets for comparison. 
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By introducing the two additional components and selecting 
high temperature and low flow as functional failures in both, 
this resulted in an additional ambiguity group i.e. there were 
now two ambiguity groups: 
1. Group 1        consisted of high temperature in the 
Oil-Injected Compressor (8c) and the LO Separator 
& Reservoir (10). 
2. Group 2        consisted of low lube oil flow rate in 
the LO Supply Pump (17) and the LO Filter (26). 
 
Referring to the table in Appendix 4, failure of components 
(3), (8a), (41) are easily detected/isolated by a single 
measurement i.e. low pressure (3), low torque (8a), high 
temperature (15) respectively. 
Referring to the upper section of the table in Appendix 4, a 
loss of flow at component (8c) could be from a failure of 
components (3), (8a), (8c, temperature + flow), (10, 
temperature only), (17) or (26). 
However, if I do not have corresponding failures – low 
pressure (3) or low torque (8a), those are ruled out leaving 
the two ambiguity groups – an increase in temperature at 
(8c) or (10) OR a loss of flow at (17) or (26). 
A similar scenario exists with measurement of temperature 
at component (24), it could be from either of the ambiguity 
groups i.e. an increase in temperature at (8c) or (10) OR a 
loss of flow at (17) or (26). 
In terms of the ideal sensor set from this analysis, all four 
sensor sets are suitable for the detection/isolation of 
components (3), (8a) and (41).  For the four failures 
embedded in the two ambiguity groups, sensor set #32 
utilises pressure, temperature and flow to detect/isolate the 
components whereas #21 only utilises pressure and 
temperature – therefore #32 is preferred to #21. 
Comparing sensor set #32 with #55, both utilise pressure, 
temperature and flow to detect/isolate the components in the 
ambiguity groups but at different locations. 
One could argue that despite having one less sensor, #32 is 
the preferred sensor set compared with #55.  Pressure 
measurement at (7) provides no significant advantage to 
#55, whereas pressure measurement at compressor 
discharge pipework (9) is a key process parameter of the 
system and on this basis sensor set #32 would be the 
preferred option from this analysis. 
5.5 Diagnostic Analysis #5 
The modelling software does not assign sensors first, once a 
sensor set has been selected, appropriate sensors types can 
then be assigned.  Further analysis was required to assess 
the locations where the standard design approach assigns 
sensors to understand how that affected system coverage, 
fitness, number of sensors and type of sensors.  Therefore, 
components and functional failures were selected based on 
the location and type of sensors shown on the P&ID’s 
supplied by the OEM.  The table in Appendix 5 details the 
selected sensor sets for comparison. 
The selected components resulted in two ambiguity groups: 
1. Group 1        consisted of high temperature in the 
Oil-Injected Compressor (8c) and the LO Manifold 
(27). 
2. Group 2         consisted of low lube oil pressure in 
the LO Pipeline (18) and LO Manifold (27) / low 
lube oil flow rate in the LO Filter (26). 
 
Of the sensor sets detailed in the table in Appendix 5, #37 
offers the best sensor spread despite the low percentage 
coverage available from all sensor sets, 7 process (gas & oil) 
sensors + 1 sensor for the motor assembly.  It has three 
sensor types for identification of the ambiguity groups and 
the locations of the sensors determined by the functional 
analysis mirror very closely the locations determined by the 
standard design approach for pressure and temperature 
measurement specifically. 
The maximum number of ambiguity groups achievable from 
this model is two.  Increasing the number of components for 
functional failure analysis results in additional components 
being added to the existing ambiguity groups.  As an 
example, if almost all the components in the model, 
pressure/flow/rotational outflows were selected for low 
failure whilst temperature outflows were selected for high 
failure, the analysis still produced two ambiguity groups 
with the temperature group containing 6 components and 
the lube oil group containing 16 components. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper sought to compare the sensor set design based on 
the traditional engineering/design approach with a design 
based on the functional analysis of the system.  Although 
analysis #1 returns sensor sets with 100% coverage, there 
are only 4 components selected for functional failure 
analysis.  This however does not reflect the actual number 
of components that are critical in this system.  Analyses #2 
to #4 were designed to demonstrate the increased 
complexity in detecting/isolating functional failures as the 
size of the system for analysis is increased.  This is shown 
by the creation and subsequent increase of Ambiguity 
Groups, the variation in the number of components within 
an Ambiguity Group and the complexity of the logic (as 
shown by the ±1 perturbations) in the excel exports of the 
Propagation Tables.  In diagnostic analysis #5, the selection 
of components for failure analysis reflects those that in an 
actual compressor, are monitored by pressure, temperature 
and flow sensors for either control, shutdown or indication 
only purposes.  None of the sensor sets in this analysis 
group provide a sensor set optimising locations and 
numbers, nor do they mirror those used in the actual 
compressor – which is a challenge for justifying the use of 
functional analysis for sensor set assignment when 
compared with the requirements set out in the API 
standards.  It is possible to manually generate a sensor set, 




EUROPEAN CONFERENCE OF THE PROGNOSTICS AND HEALTH MANAGEMENT SOCIETY 2018 
11 
 
Functional Analysis is not traditionally used in the oil and 
gas sector, either for compressor design nor the other key 
pieces of equipment in use e.g. subsea systems, however, it 
is a useful process in identifying risks and how those risks 
can propagate throughout the system with respect to the 
design function.  Functional analysis is an automated 
process and can determine the system response to the 
functional failure of a component as the failure propagates 
throughout the system as mapped in the model, resulting in 
a detailed breakdown of the events that can lead to a 
functional failure of the system i.e. the Propagation Table.  
Functional Analysis software applications can present the 
data for further analysis, including FTA and RBD, where 
the latter can facilitate Functional Reliability (and 
Availability) Analysis of each component within the system.  
In addition to mapping out the propagation of functional 
failures and the subsequent identification of the components 
that pose a risk to the operation, reliability and availability 
of the system, a functional analysis can facilitate the critical 
analysis of the failure modes of the components that make 
up the system i.e. FMECA. 
 
The traditional approach to performing a FMECA is very 
time consuming and requires a significant amount of manual 
data entry in the corresponding documentation, in addition 
to the time taken to decide/analyse all failures.  Functional 
analysis software suites can generate the FMECA report 
most likely with less manual data entry, as many of the 
fields use default information from the model.  A similar 
level of diligence is required in defining component failure, 
the cause of the failure and any effects/symptoms etc. 
whether the user is using a functional model or following 
the traditional approach.  The advantage of using functional 
analysis and its internal software FMECA tool, is that 
everything is in the one database and therefore if changes 
are made to the model, e.g. modifications to a component’s 
failure diagram, then the associated changes can be updated 
(i.e. O,S&D rankings) and the FMECA report re-generated. 
 
In the current economic climate where performance criteria 
are measured in terms of safety, reliability, availability and 
maintainability of an asset, deriving many of the technical 
and managerial decisions associated with these criteria can 
be facilitated by utilising a model-based approach.  
Functional models facilitate management of assets with a 
suite of analysis tools e.g.: RBD, FMECA, FTA & RCM.  
By integrating these processes, which would otherwise be 
carried out in isolation, in a model-based system, many of 
the processes can be streamlined, standardised and 
automated.  By deriving the reports from the functional 
model of the asset, this can lead to greater consistency in the 
reporting and decision-making processes, resulting in 
efficiency savings and potentially cost savings. 
 
In terms of the benefit to stakeholders in embracing a 
functional analysis approach to the design/operation of a 
compressor package or any other form of industrial 
equipment, let me offer the following thoughts.  The OEM’s 
wish to promote their products in terms of increased 
reliability and availability whilst minimising maintenance 
costs, downtime etc.  The Operator/owner demands a 
product whose reliability/availability ensures maximum 
productivity/uptime at the plant where the product is 
deployed and therefore a product that has verifiable 
reliability/availability data and requires minimum 
maintenance in terms of costs/downtime/spares is a key 
consideration.  The design/engineering group may limit 
OEM’s during the bidding process to those that possess 
verifiable reliability/availability data or have 
systems/processes in place, e.g. models of their system, that 
can capture this type of data.  The OEM is best placed to 
define and create the system model, however will require 
collaboration with the operator/owner to obtain the 
necessary data that can verify the accuracy of the model that 
represents the operating conditions that the equipment is 
subjected to when in operation.  The OEM may be able to 
perform functional analysis of their own product from a 
reliability/availability perspective but may require some 
form of collaboration or servitization arrangement with 
operator/owner to obtain MTTF/MTTR data as well as 
operational and maintenance test data.  The operator/owner 
does not want a compressor package that is unreliable and 
requiring excessive maintenance intervention particularly if 
the OEM is required to deploy maintenance personnel to 
support the operator/owner’s staff.  This is going to be very 
costly over the life cycle of the compressor.  It may appear 
to be in the interests of the OEM, however increased costs 
and unreliability will force the operator/owner to seek a 
more reliable compressor from a competitor.  In the long run 
this will not be in the OEM’s interests.  If the OEM’s can 
provide Health Management solutions including the ability 
to accurately predict the future health of their equipment, in 
addition to a more reliable and therefore more cost-effective 
package, then the interests of the manufacturers and the 
customers (operator/owner) are more closely aligned. 
 
NOMENCLATURE 
API  American Petroleum Institute 
BM  Breakdown Maintenance 
BS  British Standard 
CBM  Condition Based Maintenance 
DBM  Detection Based Maintenance 
DOM  Design Out Maintenance 
FBM  Failure Based Maintenance 
FMEA  Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
FMECA Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality 
Analysis 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
HAZOP Hazard and Operability 
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HSE Health and Safety Executive 
IEC International Electrotechnical 
Commission 
ISO International Organisation for 
Standardisation 
LO Lube Oil 
LOPA Layer of Protection Analysis 
MADe™ Maintenance Aware Design environment 
MTTF Mean Time to Failure 
MTTR Mean Time to Repair 
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer 
O, S & D Occurrence, Severity & Detectability 
PdM Predictive Maintenance 
PFD Process Flow Diagram 
PFD2 Probability of Failure on Demand 
PHA Process Hazard Analysis 
PHM Prognostics and Health Management 
P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram 
PSV Pressure Safety Valve 
RAM Reliability Availability and 
Maintainability 
RBD Reliability Block Diagram 
RCM Reliability Centered Maintenance 
ReqIM Requirements for Integrity Management 
ReqMM Requirements for Maintenance 
Management 
RPN Risk Priority Number 
RTF Run to Failure 
SIF Safety Instrumented Function 
SIL Safety Integrity Level 
SIS Safety Instrumented System 
TBM Time Based Maintenance 
TCV Temperature Control Valve 
T&C’s terms and Conditions 
UBM  Usage Based Maintenance 
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